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Note
Sedima and Bankers Trust: Second Circuit
Delivers a Mortal Blow to Private Civil RICO
Actions
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,1
was enacted by Congress primarily to combat racketeering ac-
tivity by organized crime.2 Section 1962 of RICO makes it un-
lawful to acquire an interest in any enterprise affecting
interstate commerce using income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity; to acquire an interest in an enterprise af-
fecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering
activity; to participate in the affairs of an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity;
or to conspire to commit any of the above three offenses.3
RICO provides that a "pattern of racketeering activity" consists
of "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which oc-
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. I No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84
Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
2. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).
3. This section provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering activity... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the ac-
tivities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).
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curred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years. . after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity."' 4 Section 1961(1) defines
"racketeering activity" as any one of a specified list of predicate
acts, including the relatively common federal offenses of mail
fraud and wire fraud as well as a variety of other federal and
state offenses.5 Congress indicated the broad scope it intended
for RICO by stating that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."6
In addition to setting forth criminal penalties in section
1963, 7 RICO contains a civil remedies provision, section 1964.
This section authorizes the Attorney General to institute civil
4. Id. § 1961(5).
5. Specifically, § 1961(1) provides:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provi-
sions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (re-
lating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section
664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sec-
tions 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section
1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section
1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sec-
tion 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating
to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate trans-
portation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlaw-
ful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition
of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating
to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to
white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29,
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on pay-
ments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States ....
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
7. Under § 1963, any person violating any of RICO's four prohibitions is
subject to a fine of not more than $25,000, imprisonment for not more than 20
years, or both, and forfeiture of any interest acquired or maintained in viola-
tion of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
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RICO injunctive actions8 and also creates a private civil remedy
that allows any person whose business or property is injured
"by reason of a violation of section 1962" to recover from the
violator treble damages as well as costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees.9 Although the Justice Department gradually began
implementing the criminal provisions of RICO, civil RICO went
virtually unused for ten years following its enactment.10 In re-
cent years, however, greater awareness of civil RICO's breadth
and its treble damages remedy has resulted in a phenomenal
increase in the number of private civil RICO suits," with plain-
tiffs bringing traditional fraud claims within the purview of
RICO's protections.' 2
This increased use of private civil RICO has been accompa-
nied by a growing judicial discomfort with the broad scope of
the treble damages remedy.' 3 Seeking to stem the tide of suits,
courts have imposed a variety of limitations on the literal
breadth of the statute.14 Some courts require that a plaintiff al-
lege that the defendant is connected with organized crime.'5
8. Id. § 1964(a), (b). Section 1964(a) specifically enables federal courts to
prevent and restrain violations of § 1962 by issuing orders including, but not
limited to, those ordering any person to divest any interest in any enterprise,
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities of any person, and or-
dering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. Id. § 1964(a).
9. Id. § 1964(c).
10. See Blakey & Gettings, RICO: Evening Up the Odds, TRIAL, Oct. 1980,
at 58, 60; Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age" Some Maturational Problems and
Proposals for Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 285, 285 (1983).
11. See Wexler, supra note 10, at 286.
12. A number of courts have entertained private civil RICO claims pre-
mised- on common law fraud violations. See USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin En-
ergy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95-96 (6th Cir. 1982); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146,
1154 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 391, 395-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing complaint because plead-
ings lacked specificity, but disagreeing with defendants' argument that fraud is
never actionable under RICO); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, 545 F. Supp.
1002, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (dismissing securities fraud claim brought under
RICO because plaintiff failed to allege that injury was "by reason of" RICO
violation).
13. See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 493 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
14. See Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (noting
that "federal courts increasingly are refusing to find a RICO claim in civil
cases even though such a claim could fall within a literal reading of the
statute").
15. See Hokama v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal.
1983); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260
(E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Most courts reject this organized crime nexus requirement, reasoning that
Congress recognized that RICO had to be broad enough to include white collar
1985]
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Other courts require plaintiffs to show that they suffered a
"competitive injury" as a result of defendants' actions.16 Still
crime as well as organized crime. See, e.g., Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams
Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d
1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063
(1982), affd in par4 rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); see also Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME LAW. 237, 249-53, 342-
49 (1982) (although organized crime may have been Congress's primary con-
cern, Congress also realized that fraud was a pervasive problem that RICO
could counter); Wexler, supra note 10, at 333 (RICO's definition of racketeer-
ing is the only principled definition of "organized crime" because limiting
RICO's application to persons fitting in the traditional organized crime cate-
gory probably would be unconstitutional for being based on ethnicity). For a
more detailed discussion regarding the undesirability of an organized crime re-
quirement, see infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
16. Courts imposing the competitive injury requirement argue that be-
cause RICO's treble damages provision, § 1964(c), was based on a similar Clay-
ton Act provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), Congress intended that RICO
plaintiffs allege a competitive injury similar to that required of antitrust plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211
(N.D. Ill. 1980). That the wording of the Clayton Act influenced RICO's draft-
ers is evident from the House discussion of RICO: "[P]rivate persons injured
by reason of a violation of the title may recover treble damages in Federal
courts-another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against
organized criminality." 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
The Supreme Court has characterized a "competitive injury" under antitrust
law as one reflecting "the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation." Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486-89 (1977).
The vast majority of courts reject the competitive injury requirement, rea-
soning that since the purposes behind the two statutes differ, imposing anti-
trust standing requirements on RICO plaintiffs runs counter to legislative
intent. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d
1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (1982),
affd in part; rev'd in par 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 527 (1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 n.11
(D. Mass. 1982). Bennett notes that the financial ruin of an antitrust defend-
ant "would generally lessen competition and increase concentration in a par-
ticular industry. RICO, on the other hand, is concerned [sic] to 'strik[e] . . .a
mortal blow against the property interests of organized crime.'" Bennett, 685
F.2d at 1059 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska)).
The Bennett court concluded that there are "few countervailing reasons to
lessen the impact of RICO remedies by importing the limitations on standing
which apply in antitrust law." Id. at 1059; see also Cenco Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (analo-
gies to standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act are forced); Ralston v. Capper,
569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (RICO is designed to ruin those per-
[Vol. 69:909
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other courts, uncomfortable with plaintiffs' suing under civil
RICO for injuries caused solely by the defendants' predicate
acts, impose a "racketeering injury" standing requirement.17
These courts have described racketeering injuries as "the type
[of injury] the RICO statute was intended to prevent"' 8 or
"something more than the injury resulting from the alleged un-
derlying predicate crimes."'19 Although no court before 1984
sons at which it is aimed); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F.
Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (requirement of competitive or commercial in-
jury is inconsistent with RICO's purpose); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1042 (1980) (observing that the "policies behind
the antitrust standing rules make the rules generally inapplicable to RICO").
17. Approximately half of the district courts that have addressed the issue
have imposed some sort of "racketeering injury" requirement. See, eg., Mar-
golis v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New York, 585 F. Supp. 595, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Hudson v.
Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F.
Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp.
846, 852 (E.D. Va. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (D.D.C.
1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (EM.
Mich. 1983); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-08
(C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower &
Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981). No circuit court prior to 1984
had adopted the racketeering injury requirement. But see Alexander Grant &
Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984) (seemingly overrul-
ing the leading case of Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (1982), aff'd in part,
rev'd in par 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
527 (1983), and adopting a strain of the racketeering injury requirement); in-
fra note 118.
The other half of the district courts and two circuit courts do not require
the plaintiff to allege a discrete racketeering injury. See, eg., Haroco v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985); Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies,
Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp.
561, 568-69 (NMD. Cal. 1984); Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F.
Supp. 408, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 167
(D.D.C. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 & n.19 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 278-79 (D.
Md. 1983). For a detailed description and analysis of the "distinct RICO in-
jury" requirement of Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.LW. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657),
which is similar conceptually to the racketeering injury requirement, see infra
notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
18. Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
19. King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). This "some-
thing more" definition does little to elucidate the meaning of "racketeering in-
jury." The incoherence of the applicable law regarding the definition of
"racketeering injury" left one court "much in the same predicament Justice
1985]
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had so held, dicta in two federal district court decisions inti-
mated that civil liability under section 1964(c) might be condi-
tioned on prior criminal convictions of either the predicate acts
or criminal RICO itself.20
Two panels of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently imposed standards on private civil RICO actions so strin-
gent that civil RICO may be destined to become nothing more
than words in a statute book. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.,21 a divided panel held that a private plaintiff must meet
two requirements to maintain a cause of action for a compensa-
ble civil RICO injury. First, the plaintiff must allege a "racke-
teering injury," that is, an injury caused by "mobsters ...
[who] cause systematic harm to competition and the market."22
Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was
criminally convicted of the predicate acts that comprise the pat-
tern of racketeering activity.23  In Bankers Trust Co. v.
Stewart must have found himself .... To paraphrase his unusually applica-
ble words: 'I know [a civil RICO violation] when I see it, and the [one alleged]
in this case is not that.'" Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466,
1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)).
20. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125, 1137-38 n.12 (D.Mass. 1982); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F.
Supp. 1019, 1022 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Morosani v.
First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983). Until 1984, how-
ever, no court had ever held that civil RICO demanded prior criminal convic-
tions; indeed, every court that necessarily considered the question held that
such convictions were not required. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Longhorn Secs.
Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 270-71 (W.D. Okla. 1983); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Glusband v.
Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodi-
ties, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank of Delaware v.
Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978); see also United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the fed-
eral government may seek sanctions solely under civil RICO for acts also pun-
ishable under criminal RICO, thereby implying that criminal convictions are
not required), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
21. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985) (No. 84-
648). The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on
January 14, 1985, and scheduled arguments for April 1985.
22. Id. at 495-96. Sedima's racketeering injury requirement should be dis-
tinguished from the "traditional" racketeering injury requirement imposed by
many courts. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Under the traditional
racketeering injury requirement, plaintiffs would need to allege "something
more" than the injury caused by the underlying predicate offenses, whereas
under Sedima's mobster-related racketeering injury requirement, plaintiffs
must allege a competition-threatening injury caused by mobsters.
23. 741 F.2d at 503.
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CIVIL RICO
Rhoades,2 a different divided panel held that a civil RICO
plaintiff must allege a "distinct RICO injury," that is, a propri-
etary injury caused by the defendant's use of a pattern of racke-
teering activity rather than merely by the predicate
racketeering acts themselves.25
This Note contends that the panels in Sedima and Bankers
Trust imposed unjustifiable limitations on the scope of private
civil RICO. Part I examines the Sedima and Bankers Trust
standing requirements and their analytical flaws. It asserts
that Sedima's racketeering injury requirement, which requires
plaintiffs to allege "mobster" activity, is simply a restatement
of the unworkable organized crime nexus requirement. It next
analyzes the Bankers Trust "discrete RICO injury" require-
ment and argues that private civil RICO plaintiffs should have
standing to sue for injuries caused by defendants' individual
predicate acts. Part II reviews Sedima's prior convictions re-
quirement and asserts that it is, in effect, a judicial amendment
to private civil RICO that has serious practical shortcomings.
The Note concludes that any necessary limitations on the scope
of private civil RICO should be imposed by Congress, after full
consideration of all competing policies, rather than by the
courts.
I. THE SEDIMA AND BANKERS TRUST STANDING
REQUIREMENTS
Although the Sedima and Bankers Trust panels each held
that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege and prove an injury
caused by "a violation of section 1962,"26 the panels differed as
to what constitutes such an injury. The Sedima panel relied on
the legislative intent underlying RICO, arguing that because
RICO was aimed primarily at organized crime, plaintiffs must
allege a racketeering injury caused by mobsters. The Bankers
Trust panel focused instead on civil RICO's statutory language,
concluding that the injury must be caused by a pattern of predi-
cate acts rather than by the predicate acts themselves.
Although the panels reached different conclusions regarding
the nature of compensable injuries, they both imposed limita-
24. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.LW. 3367
(U.S. Oct. 24,1984) (No. 84-657).
25. Id at 516. For a summary of the judicial reaction to Sedima and
Bankers Trust, see infra note 118.
26. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494; Bankers Trus; 741 F.2d at 516.
19851
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tions on the scope of civil RICO that are ultimately
unjustifiable.
A. THE SEDIMA RACKETEERING INJURY REQUIREMENT
The Sedima panel concluded that a valid civil RICO claim
must contain an allegation of an independent "racketeering in-
jury" that is caused by "mobsters .... [who] cause systematic
harm to competition and the market, and thereby injure inves-
tors and competitors. '27 In developing its racketeering injury
requirement, the Sedima panel focused on RICO's legislative
history and noted initially that RICO was directed primarily at
organized crime.28 The panel reasoned that many injuries
caused solely by section 1961(1) offenses are compensable
through non-RICO actions and that a civil RICO action there-
fore arises only when "mobsters" cause systematic harm that is
different from any injury caused merely by the predicate acts
and unrelated to mobster activity.29 The Sedima panel thus
saw RICO as a tool with which to attack those specific activities
that Congress intended RICO to deter rather than as a means
of federalizing common law offenses. 30 The panel also argued
that Congress's use in section 1964(c) of the Clayton Act's "by
reason of" language 3 ' demonstrated its intent to create a stand-
ing barrier to civil RICO actions analogous to the Clayton Act's
competitive injury barrier.3 2 This congressional intent demands
that the plaintiff allege not only that the predicate acts caused
the injury, but that the injury was a "racketeering injury," that
is, one caused by mobster-related racketeering activity of the
kind that Congress identified as threatening competition.33
The binding thread running through the Sedima panel's
reasoning is that "Congress . . .would at least have discussed
it" had Congress intended to grant a private cause of action for
injuries caused by predicate acts unrelated to mobster activity
27. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96.
28. Id at 487.
29. Id at 495-96. This requirement is somewhat similar to the Bankers
Trust requirement that the injury be caused by the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity rather than by the predicate acts themselves. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 53-61. For a discussion of the important differences between these
two standing requirements, see infra note 61.
30. See 741 F.2d at 492, 494.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
32. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494. For a discussion of "competitive injury" and
the Clayton Act's competitive injury standing barrier, see supra note 16.
33. 741 F.2d at 495-96.
[Vol. 69:909
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and already compensable under state law.34 The panel stressed
the lack of congressional debate on the most attractive feature
of the civil RICO action-the private civil cause of action for
treble damages in section 1964(c).35 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee added the remedy to the Senate bill36 at the end of the
legislative session, foreclosing discussion of it by the Senate
committee responsible for the bill.37 The addition of a private
civil cause of action apparently was not considered a major al-
teration of the bill.ss For the Sedira panel, this "remarkable
fact... itself indicates that Congress did not intend the section
to have the extraordinary impact claimed for it."3 9 The panel
believed that the silence in the legislative history regarding pri-
vate civil RICO indicated that Congress did not intend the pro-
vision to "provide an alternate and more attractive scheme for
private parties to remedy violations of [existing] laws."40 The
"racketeering injury" requirement, therefore, represented to
the panel a logical, functional limitation ensuring that civil
RICO would be available only to those persons for whom Con-
gress intended it.
Despite the Sedimna panel's adoption of the racketeering in-
jury requirement, it cited the earlier Second Circuit case of
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.41 for the proposition that a civil
RICO plaintiff need not allege that the defendant is associated
with organized crime.42 Ironically, however, by limiting com-
34. Id. at 492.
35. Id. at 488-92.
36. The bill at issue, S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 829 (1969)
(text of bill), eventually became the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. The Senate added RICO, Title IX of the Act,
to the bill. This addition was the culmination of prior efforts in the Senate to
develop a "RICO-type" statute; earlier Senate bills had contained most of the
substance of RICO. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Rrc. 9568-71
(1969) (text of bill); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969)
(text of bill); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 18,007 (1967) (intro-
duction of bill); S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 18,007 (1967) (in-
troduction of bill). There were also two House predecessors to RICO. See
LR 19,586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 35,242 (1970) (introduction of
bill); H.R. 19,215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 31,914 (1970) (introduc-
tion of bill). See generally Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488 n.18 (presenting in detail
RICO's "long legislative lineage").
37. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 489.
38. Id at 489-90. When the Judiciary Committee introduced the amended
bill to the full House, it did not even announce the addition of the private
treble damages remedy. Id. at 490.
39. Id. at 490.
40. Id. at 492.
41. 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
42. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492 & n.31. In Moss, a private party brought a
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pensable injuries to those caused by mobsters, Sedima effec-
tively overruled Moss sub silentio, letting the "organized crime"
requirement in through the back door.43
Although the panel correctly noted that organized crime
was Congress's primary target when it enacted RICO, the
panel's racketeering injury requirement represents an inappro-
priate limitation on a statute that Congress deliberately drafted
broadly.44 RICO's plain language does not restrict its use to de-
fendants associated with organized crime,45 and the congres-
sional debate over RICO indicates that Congress rejected such a
requirement for several reasons. First, any attempted defini-
tion of "organized crime" threatened to create an unconstitu-
tional status-based offense.46 Furthermore, Congress realized
civil action under § 1964(c) for injuries sustained "by reason of" defendants' al-
leged predicate violations of the federal securities laws. The district court dis-
missed the complaint, reasoning, inter alia, that plaintiff had failed to allege
defendants were associated with organized crime. Moss, 719 F.2d at 20. The
Second Circuit disagreed with this reasoning, stating that RICO's statutory
language "does not premise a RICO violation on proof or allegations of any
connection with organized crime." Id. at 21 & n.17. Although this statement
was dictum because the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
on other grounds, id. at 23, the Sedima panel accepted it as the Second Circuit
position, Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492.
43. Although the panel impliedly disclaimed the similarity of the terms
"mobster" and "organized crime" by noting that the Second Circuit had re-
jected the organized crime requirement, see Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492 & n.31,
the functional equivalence of the two terms is evidenced throughout the opin-
ion. The panel noted that RICO was enacted to fight organized crime and
later stated that the "by reason of" language in § 1964(c) was intended "to
limit standing to those injured by . . . an injury of the type RICO was
designed to prevent." Id. at 495. The panel also expressed shock and dismay
at the "extraordinary, if not outrageous" way courts had applied civil RICO to
"such respected and legitimate 'enterprises' as the American Express Com-
pany, E.F. Hutton & Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill
Lynch." Id. at 487. The panel further bemoaned that there are only a "few
reported cases where RICO has been used against reputed mobsters or at least
against organized criminals." Id.
44. See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing that "it is ... clear that Congress
deliberately chose the very broad language of RICO's provisions"), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964.
46. Representative Biaggi attempted to limit RICO to organized crime by
proposing an amendment that would have limited its use to those persons as-
sociated with "nationally organized criminal groups composed of persons of
Italian ancestry forming an underworld government . . .who direct or con-
duct a pattern of racketeering activity and control the national operation of a
criminal enterprise in furtherance of a monopolistic trade restraining criminal
conspiracy." 116 CONG. REc. 35,343 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi). Repre-
sentative Poff, arguing against the amendment, stated:
I am concerned that such an amendment would raise serious constitu-
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that the evils at which RICO was aimed often are perpetrated
by persons not falling within the traditional definition of organ-
ized crime.47 Since Congress designed RICO to proscribe cer-
tain types of behavior, the statute was carefully drafted to
address organized criminality, not the nebulous concept of or-
ganized crime.48 Finally, Congress knew that requiring a plain-
tiff to prove the defendant's association with organized crime
would create an almost insurmountable burden for the RICO
tional problems. The Supreme Court has observed that simple mem-
bership in an organization is not enough to justify the imposition of
criminal sanctions. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). In
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), the U. S. Supreme Court
struck down a New Jersey statute making membership in a criminal
gang a punishable offense. In that case, and in Robison v. California,
[sic] 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court indicated that status itself
may not be made a basis for a criminal conviction.
116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (statement of Rep. Poff). After other representatives
objected to the amendment on similar grounds, it was defeated. See id. at
35,346. At the time of the amendment's defeat, the House was aware of
RICO's private treble damages provision because Representative Poff had an-
nounced it earlier. See id. at 35,295 (statement of Rep. Poff). The House thus
rejected this organized crime-RICO link for both criminal and civil RICO.
Even apart from these ethnicity and status-based constitutional problems,
the adoption of an organized crime requirement in RICO could have raised the
problem of how "organized crime" could be adequately defined. If no precise
definition were attempted, the general term "organized crime" might have
been subject to attack on vagueness grounds. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 US.
118, 123 (1967) (void for vagueness doctrine applicable to civil actions when
standard is "so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all")
(quoting Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925)). The
Sedima "mobster" requirement suffers from an analogous lack of precision.
47. As explained by Representative Poff while discussing another title of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 'The concept of organized criminal
activity is broader in scope than the concept of organized crime; it is meant to
include any criminal activity collectively undertaken ... ." 116 CONG. R.
35,293 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Several other excerpts from RICO's
legislative history indicate that Congress was well aware that RICO would ad-
dress all "organized criminality," that is, all patterns of racketeering activity.
See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969) (Senators Hart and Ken-
nedy noting that S. 30 reaches beyond organized crime); 116 CONG. REC. 35,344
(1970) (Rep. Poff stating that "organized crime" is not a precise concept, but
rather a functional one "serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to
a large and varying group of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse
circumstances"); id. at 35,295 (1970) (Rep. Poff observing that RICO's treble
damages remedy is an example of an antitrust remedy "being adapted for use
against organized criminality").
48. As Judge Richard A. Posner has stated, "Congress deliberately cast
the net of liability wide, being more concerned to avoid opening loopholes
through which the minions of organized crime might crawl to freedom than to
avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble-damage pro-
ceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes." Sutliff, Inc. v. Dono-
van Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
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plaintiff to overcome. 49
Most courts have heeded these concerns, declining to en-
graft onto RICO the organized crime requirement implicitly re-
jected by its drafters.50 Even though one of Congress's primary
targets was the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organ-
ized crime, Congress enacted RICO to prohibit any pattern of
racketeering activity affecting commerce.5 1 Congress recog-
nized that civil RICO could not be limited to members of organ-
ized crime in any principled manner and that there was no
sound policy justification for attempting to do so. RICO was
aimed at racketeering, not racketeers.52
B. THE BANKER~s TRUST "DISTINCT RICO INJURY"
REQUIREMENT
In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,53 another divided Second
Circuit panel reached a conclusion somewhat different from
49. The difficulty in proving that a violator is a member of a traditional
organized crime "family" was highlighted in 1967 by Senator Percy when he
addressed the need for a RICO-type statute. Senator Percy noted that the
most important reason why organized crime flourishes in modem America Is
the "difficulty of obtaining evidence, admissible in court .... [These known
robber barons of the mid-20th Century are rarely brought to justice because
our system of law handicaps itself. These handicaps take many forms .... "
113 CONG. REC. 18,004 (1967) (statement of Sen. Percy). It is not difficult to
imagine the "handicap" plaintiffs would be under if they had to prove defend-
ants were members of organized crime; indeed, even constructing a workable
definition of the concept might prove futile. See Horn, When to Bring a Rack-
eteering Claim, 9 LITIGATION, Summer 1983, at 33, 34 (plaintiffs would have a
hard time proving defendants are associated with organized crime; the one
person the federal government persuaded to testify as to the existence of an
organized crime underworld is not "available" for the current crop of RICO
cases).
50. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
51. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
52. Sedima's mobster-related racketeering injury requirement bears a
striking resemblance to the competitive injury requirement adopted by some
courts. See supra note 16. Although the Sedima panel rejected an "antitrust-
type" competitive injury requirement in favor of an "analogous" racketeering
injury requirement, see Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495, and the Bankers Trust panel
rejected the competitive injury requirement, see Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516
n.6, the language in Sedima indicates that the Sedima panel would require at
least some of the characteristics of the traditional competitive injury require-
ment. To what extent Sedima's requirement that civil RICO plaintiffs allege
the "kinds of [acts that] often affect competition ... even if in the particular
case no harm to competition results," Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496 n.41, survives
the Bankers Trust rejection of the competitive injury requirement remains to
be seen.
53. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
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the Sedima panel regarding the nature of a compensable civil
RICO injury, holding that civil RICO plaintiffs may sue only
for "distinct RICO injuries" caused by a pattern of racketeering
activity, not for injuries caused by individual predicate acts.1
The Bankers Trust panel based its holding on the wording of
section 1964(c), noting that a civil plaintiff cannot recover un-
less injured "by reason of" a section 1962 violation.-5 The panel
reasoned that section 1962 is violated only if "there are present
both (1) the pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) the use of
that pattern to invest in, control, or conduct, a RICO enter-
prise."56 Section 1962 therefore does not prohibit the predicate
acts that constitute racketeering activity, and a plaintiff's injury
is not caused "by reason of" a section 1962 violation when the
injury results from such predicate acts. Instead, a plaintiff can
only recover under section 1964(c) when injured by the defend-
ant's use of a pattern to participate in a RICO enterprise. 57
The plaintiff-appellant in Bankers Trust argued that injury
caused by the predicate acts cannot be distinguished concep-
tually from injury caused by the pattern of predicate acts.m
The panel, however, rejected this argument: "If a plaintiff's in-
jury is that caused by the predicate acts themselves, he is in-
jured regardless of whether or not there is a pattern; hence he
cannot be said to be injured by the pattern, and the pattern
cannot be said to be the but-for cause of the injury."59 The
panel provided a hypothetical example of an injury caused by
the pattern rather than by the predicate acts:
[A] plaintiff who is victimized by a defendant enterprise's multiple
acts of arson may thereafter be denied fire insurance as a result of his
fire history, such a plaintiff whose property subsequently suffers in-
nocent fire damage would be unable to obtain reimbursement for the
damage, and his monetary loss would be the result of the pattern of
predicate acts of the enterprise, rather than any of the individual
54. Id- at 516-17. The Bankers Trust panel did not address Sedima's re-
quirement that compensable civil RICO injuries be caused by mobsters.
The Bankers Trust "distinct RICO injury" requfrement appears to be the
latest version of the traditional racketeering injury requirement. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text. Although many earlier cases described racke-
teering injuries as "something more than the injury resulting from the alleged
underlying predicate crimes," see supraz note 19, Bankers Trust refined this de-
scription by defining compensable civil RICO injuries as injuries caused by a
pattern of predicate acts rather than by the predicate acts themselves, see
Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516-17.
55. Id. at 516.
56. I&
57. I& (quoting Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494).
58. See Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 517.
59. Id- (emphasis in original).
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acts.60
After Bankers Trust, therefore, plaintiffs must allege injury
caused solely by a pattern of predicate acts in order to have
standing to sue-any injuries caused by any of the predicate
acts themselves are not compensable under civil RICO.6 1
Because the plain meaning of RICO's statutory language
controls in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the con-
trary, the propriety of the panel's "distinct RICO injury" re-
quirement must be judged initially against the RICO provisions
60. Id. Significantly, the panel's example of an injury caused by the pat-
tern was hypothetical rather than derived from an actual case. This apparent
inability to cite an actual decision in which a plaintiff would be able to recover
under Bankers Trust highlights the drastic effect the panel's "distinct RICO
injury" requirement could have on the future utility of civil RICO.
61. The conclusions reached by the Sedima and Bankers Trust panels re-
garding the nature of compensable civil RICO injuries are not only different,
they are also potentially inconsistent. Although Bankers Trust squarely held
that private civil RICO plaintiffs must allege injury caused by the pattern of
racketeering activity rather than by the predicate acts, Sedima itself implied
that predicate acts alone could cause the requisite injury. The Sedima panel,
in discussing the competition-threatening injury required under RICO, cited
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), as a case In-
volving a type of claim that "should go forward under RICO." Sedima, 741
F.2d at 496 n.41. In Hellenic Lines, the plaintiff brought a civil RICO action,
alleging injury caused by the defendants' predicate acts of bribery, illegal kick-
backs, and fraudulent billings. Hellenic Lines, 523 F. Supp. at 245, 246. The
Sedima panel stated that private civil RICO was appropriate because the
plaintiff's injury was the kind of injury at which RICO was aimed. Sedima,
741 F.2d at 496 n.41; see also id. at 496 (plaintiff must "show injury different in
kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not
simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO
was designed to deter") (emphasis added). Although not fully developed in
the opinion, these statements imply that Sedima's racketeering injury stand-
ing requirement is met if predicate acts are of the "mobster-related" type the
panel felt RICO was designed to deter.
One court has viewed the Sedima and Bankers Trust standing require-
ments as inconsistent with each other in that the Sedima panel, but not the
Bankers Trust panel, apparently would grant standing to plaintiffs who were
injured solely by predicate acts as long as those acts were related to "mobster
activity." See Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 397 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). Conversely, it ap-
pears that the Bankers Trust panel would grant standing to plaintiffs injured
by a pattern of predicate acts even if those acts were not perpetrated by mob-
sters. See supra text accompanying note 60. Since Bankers Trust did not ad-
dress this possible inconsistency, the panel may have believed it was following
Sedima. If such is the case, future civil RICO plaintiffs in the Second Circuit
may need to comply with both Sedima and Bankers Trust-they would need
to allege injury caused by a pattern of mobster-related predicate acts. Such a
requirement may eviscerate civil RICO entirely, especially in light of Sedima's
additional prior convictions requirement. See infra notes 71-117 and accompa-
nying text.
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themselves.62 According to the statute, the section 1964(c)
standing requirement is satisfied if a plaintiff is injured "by rea-
son of" a defendant's participation in the affairs of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.c6 This
standing requirement has two plausible meanings. Under one
interpretation, the plaintiff has standing if a defendant partici-
pates in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity and the acts of such participation injure the
plaintiff.64 An alternative interpretation, adopted by Bankers
Trust, requires that the plaintiff be injured because the defend-
ant used a pattern of racketeering activity to participate in the
enterprise's affairs.65 Under the latter interpretation, there-
fore, the plaintiff in a civil RICO cause of action must prove
that it would not have sustained its injury but for the defend-
ant's use of a pattern. '66
This but-for causation requirement is neither the most sen-
sible interpretation of the statute nor that supported by the leg-
islative intent underlying RICO. Initially, nothing in the
statute suggests that the pattern requirement should be singled
out as a but-for element while other elements are not.6 If the
62. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also
Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983) (observing that "silence
compels us to 'start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'") (quoting Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c).
64. This interpretation is accepted by those courts not imposing the tradi-
tional racketeering injury requirement. See, eg., Haroco v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), cerL granted,
105 S. Ct. 902 (1985); Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731
F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 568-69
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
65. Bankers Trust appears to be the first decision in which the § 1964(c)
"by reason of" language was interpreted to require an injury caused by the
pattern of predicate acts. Many earlier cases requiring a racketeering injury
required "something more" than injury caused only by the predicate acts. See,
e.g., Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New York, 585 F. Supp. 595, 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984);
Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
66. See Bankers Trus4 741 F.2d at 516-17.
67. The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the Bankers Trust but-for causa-
tion requirement as applying to each element of a § 1962 violation. See Haroco
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 396 (7th Cir.
1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). Some of the language in Bankers
Trust seems to support the Seventh Circuit's interpretation. See, eg., Bankers
Trust 741 F.2d at 516 (injury must be caused by a "RICO violation, not just
... some of the essential elements of a RICO violation"); id. at 517 (compen-
sable RICO injury caused "by reason of the defendants' use of a RICO enter-
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statutory language is accepted at face value, and there is noth-
ing in the legislative history to indicate that it should not be,
each of the RICO elements is of coequal importance. According
to the statute's plain meaning, RICO addresses injuries caused
by reason of participation through a pattern, not merely inju-
ries caused by the pattern.68
Permitting RICO actions based on injuries caused by predi-
cate offenses as well as injuries caused by a pattern of racke-
teering activity is also more consistent with the legislative
intent underlying RICO. Bankers Trust stands for the proposi-
tion that Congress intended civil RICO to address only those
injuries that are different from any injuries caused by the pred-
icate acts themselves. This position fails to take into account
the important additional deterrence value of allowing civil
RICO actions based on the harm resulting from the predicate
acts. Allowing such claims would deter the commission of the
underlying predicate offenses as well as the commission of a
RICO pattern of racketeering activity. Although there is little
legislative history regarding the intended scope of private civil
RICO, 69 the congressional belief that private actions would pro-
mote this deterrence function is reflected in RICO's treble
damages remedy.70 The Bankers Trust but-for requirement
prise and a pattern of racketeering acts"). Other language in the opinion,
however, indicates that the but-for requirement was intended to apply only to
the pattern requirement. See, e.g., id. at 517 (stating that "the pattern [must]
be the but-for cause of the injury"); id. (providing an example of a proper civil
RICO claim in which the pattern is a but-for element but the "RICO enter-
prise" element is not).
68. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c). A hypothetical example illustrates
the questionable nature of the Bankers Trust reasoning. Suppose a criminal
statute made it a crime to participate in a bank robbery through the use of
threats and violence, and a civil statute created a private cause of action for
injuries received "by reason of" a violation of this criminal law. Further sup-
pose that a defendant committed a bank robbery through the use of threats
and violence and that one of the defendant's acts of violence injured someone.
Under the "plain meaning" interpretation recommended by this Note, the
plaintiff would have standing to sue. Under the Bankers Trust interpretation,
however, there would be no standing because the same injury could have been
caused by a robber who made no threats. Only injuries that could not have
been inflicted but for the use of threats and violence, and of a type different
from any injury caused by the threats and the violence themselves, would be
compensable. In this example, the "threats plus violence" element corre-
sponds to the RICO "pattern of racketeering activity" element.
69. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-92.
70. Although this aspect of RICO's deterrence function is not specifically
addressed in RICO's legislative history, its validity is clear. Initially, the treble
damages provision was modelled after § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(1982). The Supreme Court has stated: "Congress created the treble-damages
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would preclude liability in many situations in which the de-
fendant's actions fall squarely within section 1962's prohibi-
tions. Interpreting the section 1964(c) standing requirement to
allow suits based upon the injury caused by the individual un-
derlying offenses, however, more fully realizes the deterrence
value of civil RICO.
II. THE SEDIMA PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIREMENT
Sedima was the first decision to hold that prior criminal
convictions of the predicate acts are a necessary prerequisite to
a private civil RICO action. In reaching this position, the panel
had to contend with a statute that does not specifically require
prior convictions and an imposing body of case law that ex-
pressly holds that such convictions are not required.71 The
panel attempted to distinguish this contrary case law and
adopted a strained interpretation of RICO's statutory language
based on its own somewhat creative due process notions.
Although the panel's reasoning has a certain emotional allure,
close examination in the light of legal precedent, public policy,
and practical considerations exposes its fatal weaknesses.
The Sedima panel initially argued that many of the earlier
cases holding that prior convictions are not required in a civil
RICO action "discussed the problem with little or no analy-
sis." 72 The panel characterized the leading case of United
States v. Cappetto,73 which supports the proposition that the
government may bring a civil RICO injunctive action without
remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to
antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to
the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the
antitrust laws and deterring violations." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 US.
330, 344 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Blue Shield of Virginia v. Mc-
Cready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (Congress enacted § 4 to "deter violators and
deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and ... provide ample com-
pensation to the victims of antitrust violations"). Federal courts have realized
that these same functions apply to civil RICO's treble damages provision. See,
ag., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.) (RICO has
both a compensatory and a deterrence objective), cert denied, 459 US. 880
(1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. I. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982)
(purposes of civil RICO's treble damages provision include deterring RICO's
predicate offenses and threatening violators with financial ruin); see also
Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(Congress provided for treble damages under RICO as a means of effectuating
the policy underlying the Act).
71. See supra note 20.
72. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
73. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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prior criminal convictions 7 4 as a decision that relied principally
on cases unrelated to the scope of civil RICO. 75 The panel fur-
ther argued that since Cappetto involved the government's abil-
ity to bring an injunctive action, it was not controlling in
private treble damages actions because no prosecutorial discre-
tion is available to protect against overbroad use of private civil
RICO.
7 6
The Sedima panel's attempt to distinguish Cappetto is un-
persuasive. Cappetto's reliance on cases outside the RICO con-
text was unavoidable because Cappetto was the first case to
address the prior convictions issue under RICO. The Cappetto
court itself confronted the question of the applicability of non-
RICO cases and concluded that the pertinent policies underly-
ing the cases were consistent with RICO's fundamental pur-
poses. 77  Moreover, the Sedima panel cannot justifiably
distinguish Cappetto based on the presence of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in government actions by arguing that "[t]here is no
comparable way to limit private RICO. 178 Private parties are
subject to sanctions if they bring frivolous actions under
RICO. 79 Furthermore, plaintiffs' attorneys must certify in ac-
cordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that they believe the action is well-grounded.8 0 Even accepting
74. Cappetto held that the government could seek sanctions under civil
RICO for actions also punishable under criminal RICO, implying that prior
convictions are not required under civil RICO. See Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1356-
57. As the Sedima panel noted, Cappetto is the case most often relied on by
courts that do not require prior convictions. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
75. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497.
76. See id
77. See Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1357 (policy of preventing conduct detrimen-
tal to the integrity of interstate commerce underlies RICO as well as the stat-
utes at issue in the non-RICO cases).
78. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497.
79. See King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (attorneys'
fees awarded to defendants and assessed against plaintiff's counsel when the
court found the civil RICO claim to be meritless); see also Horn, supra note 49,
at 33 (racketeering claims provoke a "visceral response in judges").
80. The Rule requires a party's attorney to sign all pleadings, motions,
and other papers and provides that such signature
constitutes a certificate by [the attorney] that [the attorney] has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of [the attor-
ney's] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
[Vol. 69:909
CIVIL RICO
the proposition that private parties are more likely to initiate
civil RICO actions than are government prosecutors, RICO's
treble damages provision demonstrates a legislative intent to
encourage challenges by private attorneys general to help fur-
ther RICO's deterrence function.8 '
The prosecutorial discretion present in government actions
actually is a reason to reject Sedima's prior convictions require-
ment because the exercise of such discretion could, in many in-
stances, divest a worthy plaintiff of a meritorious civil RICO
claim. Prosecutorial discretion includes the choice to refrain
from prosecution if the return will be slight in relation to the
effort expended and to accept guilty pleas to lesser offenses.
Under Sedima, a potential civil RICO plaintiff cannot pursue a
RICO claim, however worthy it may be, if the federal or state
prosecutor decides to refrain from initiating a criminal action
based on the suspected violator's predicate acts or to settle for a
guilty plea to an offense not appearing in the section 1961(1)
list of predicate offenses.
Moreover, because the injunctive relief available to the
government in section 1964(a) is so effective82 and relatively
easy to obtain,s3 the federal government may choose to address
RICO violations under civil RICO instead of criminal RICO.84
Having initiated a civil RICO injunctive action against a defend-
ant, the federal government may well hesitate to commence
less efficient and more burdensome criminal proceedings
81. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
82. Under § 1964(a), district courts are empowered to prevent and restrain
RICO violations by issuing orders including, but not limited to,
ordering any person to divest himself of any interest... in any en-
terprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enter-
prise engaged in... ; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
83. See United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090 (3d Cir. 1977)
(RICO's civil remedies "permit equitable restraint of economic activity... as
a substitute for criminal prosecution with its attendant procedural and consti-
tutional protection for defendants"), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); Cap-
petto, 502 F-2d at 1357 (standard of proof lower in a civil RICO case than in a
criminal action); id. at 1358-59 (in order to grant an injunction under RICO,
the traditional irreparable injury requirement need not be met).
84. It appears that Cappetto is a prime example of the government's pur-
suit of a civil RICO action to the exclusion of a criminal RICO action. See Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d at 1357 ("Conduct... which is of a kind that is traditionally
proscribed under criminal statutes... does not enjoy a special immunity from
regulation through civil proceedings .... ).
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against that same defendant for predicate act violations. Simi-
larly, state prosecutors, knowing that a federal civil RICO in-
junctive action has been filed, might be less likely to prosecute
the defendant for state law predicate act violations.85 There-
fore, the Sedima reasoning virtually guarantees that private
parties often will be unable to pursue valid claims under civil
RICO because it is relatively easy for the federal government to
do so. The availability of a federal remedy should not depend
on such uncertainties, especially in the absence of an express
declaration from Congress.
The Sedima panel also dismissed the argument that
RICO's liberal construction directive 86 favors construing civil
RICO liberally to allow actions without prior predicate act con-
victions.87 The panel stated that "due process, of course, re-
quires that criminal statutes be strictly construed."8 8 The panel
then concluded that in the civil context, the policy of strict con-
struction could not be implemented without requiring predicate
act convictions.89 In so reasoning, the panel apparently mistook
a general rule for a constitutional requirement. As the
Supreme Court stated in the criminal RICO case of United
States v. Turkette :90 "The canon in favor of strict construction
is not an inexorable command .... [I]t is satisfied if the
words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest
intent of the lawmakers." 91 Thus, the Court's relatively liberal
construction in Turkette of section 1962,92 the criminal provi-
85. As a practical matter, the prior convictions requirement raises a po-
tentially significant problem in that it virtually compels private litigants on
both sides to involve themselves in the criminal process. Plaintiffs will con-
centrate their efforts on trying to persuade prosecutors to initiate actions on
the suspected predicate act violations while defendants will expend their ener-
gies in bargaining the charges down to offenses not listed in § 1961(1). Such
private involvement surely would be detrimental to the integrity of the crimi-
nal process. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Im-
rex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985) (No. 84-
648).
86. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). For the relevant
part of this provision, see supra text accompanying note 6.
87. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502.
88. Id (quoting Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979)).
89. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502.
90. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
91. Id. at 588 n.10 (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1948)).
92. In Turkette, the Court found "no occasion to apply the rule of lenity"
to § 1962 and rejected the argument that the term "enterprise" should be
strictly construed to mean "legitimate enterprise." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 &
n.10.
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sion,93 highlights the lack of any constitutional need for
Sedima's overly strict construction of section 1964(c), the civil
provision.9
The Sedima panel supported its conclusion that civil RICO
required prior convictions with a strained reading of the statu-
tory language.9 5 The panel noted that section 1964(c) of RICO
was modelled after a similar Clayton Act provision that pro-
vides that private parties may sue for injuries caused "by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 9 6 The RICO
provision, however, provides that private parties may sue for in-
juries caused "by reason of a violation of section 1962."97 The
panel concluded that Congress had changed the wording in the
RICO provision "with a specific intent in mind-to require that
conviction at least of the predicate acts be had before a civil suit
may be brought by a private person."9 8 This argument fails to
consider that the term "violation" as it appears in other civil
statutes does not necessarily mean "criminally proven viola-
93. Section 1962 is not exclusively a criminal provision. Because both civil
and criminal RICO require that the defendant be proved to have performed
acts prohibited by § 1962, whether the provision should be viewed as civil or
criminal depends on whether the underlying action is civil or criminal in na-
ture. Turkette was a criminal RICO action brought under § 1962(c) and (d),
see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 578-79, hence the provision's criminal nature in that
context.
94. For an argument that § 1962 should be strictly construed in civil as
well as criminal RICO actions, see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L REv. 291,
310 (1983) (discussing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296
(1954), which concluded that statutes giving rise to both criminal and civil
sanctions should, as a general rule, be strictly construed in both contexts).
The Sedima panel did not address the possibility of strictly construing § 1962's
pattern and enterprise requirements and § 1961's predicate act prohibitions,
both of which are applicable in civil and criminal RICO actions, and broadly
construing the "by reason of a violation" language in the wholly civil § 1964(c)
private remedy provision. Such an approach would allow plaintiffs to sue
without alleging prior predicate act convictions and would be consonant with
RICO's directive that the statute be liberally construed to effectuate its "reme-
dial purposes." See supra text accompanying note 6.
The degree to which courts can manipulate the concepts of strict and lib-
eral construction in the civil RICO context was highlighted in Berg v. First
Am. Bankshares, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 91,826 (D.D.C.
Oct. 19, 1984). Although the Berg court adopted Sedima's prior convictions re-
quirement, it seemingly turned Sedima's general rule of strict construction of
criminal statutes on its head, stating- "The broad construction given RICO in
criminal prosecutions is simply inconsistent with the narrower construction
which must be applied in the contest of a civil case." Id. at 90, 162.
95. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
96. Id. at 498 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (emphasis added)).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added), quoted in Sedima, 741 F.2d at
498.
98. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
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tion."99 Moreover, if a criminal trial is necessary to determine
whether a "violation" occurred, the same reasoning would seem
to require a criminal trial in order to determine whether an an-
titrust defendant's actions were "forbidden" under the antitrust
laws. This has never been a requirement under the Clayton
Act provision.100
The panel also reasoned that Congress's use of such words
as "chargeable," "indictable," and "offense" in section 1961(1)
indicated that convictions were required because the words nec-
essarily were tied to the procedure of criminal cases. 10' This
reasoning is strained when viewed in light of the Supreme
Court's mandate that, absent express congressional intent to
the contrary, a statute's plain meaning controls its interpreta-
tion.10 2 The plain meaning of the terms "chargeable" and "in-
dictable" suggests acts that, "if proved by the government in a
criminal proceeding, would subject the violator to criminal
sanctions. °10 3 Not only does RICO's plain language not require
prior convictions, its "chargeable" and "indictable" language in-
dicates a specific desire not to require convictions or even in-
dictments. Furthermore, when Congress intended to require
convictions in other portions of RICO and the Organized Crime
Control Act, it did so expressly.10 4 That Congress failed to do
99. Id. at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (discussing United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 245, 248-51 (1980), in which the term "violation" in 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (1982) was not interpreted to mean criminally proven
violation); see also Victims of Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 323, 329 (1972) (testimony of Charles P. Doyle, American Law Division,
Library of Congress, rejecting the view that "violation" in § 1964(c) means
criminally proven violation).
100. No decision has required prior convictions under the Clayton Act's
private treble damages provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Indeed, it appears
that no decision has even fully addressed the issue.
101. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499-500. The panel admitted that "chargeable"
and "indictable" conceivably could mean able to be charged or indicted, but it
felt that the more plausible alternative was that the use of these words
demonstrated that
Congress did not intend to give civil courts power to determine
whether an act is "indictable" in the absence of a properly returned
indictment or "chargeable" absent an information .... Under the in-
terpretation given RICO by those courts which do not require crimi-
nal convictions of the predicate acts before the bringing of a civil
action, every private plaintiff becomes [a] one-person grand jury.
Id. at 500; see also id. at 499 ("An 'offense' speaks to conviction.").
102. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
103. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) ("Upon conviction of a person under this
section, the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property
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the same in civil RICO, therefore, manifests its intent not to re-
quire convictions.10 5
Sedima's case law and statutory analysis arguments are in-
fluenced by misplaced due process concerns. The panel argued
that not requiring prior convictions in civil RICO actions
"would provide civil remedies for offenses criminal in nature,
stigmatize defendants with the appellation 'racketeer,' [and] au-
thorize the award of damages which are clearly punitive."'1 6
Close examination reveals that each of these arguments is
unpersuasive.
First, although the panel's argument that civil actions can-
not be based on offenses "criminal in nature" unless guilt is
proven in a criminal trial has a certain emotional appeal, it
overlooks Congress's ability to constitutionally impose criminal
and civil sanctions for the same act or omission.'07 Since civil
RICO defendants are not threatened with criminal sanctions,
such as the loss of liberty, the prior convictions safeguard is un-
necessary.L8 Further, allowing civil RICO actions does not
...declared forfeited under this section . .. ."); 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)
("A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if- (1) the de-
fendant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States ....");
I& § 3575(g) ("The time for taking an appeal from a conviction... shall be
measured from imposition of the original sentence.").
105. This statutory analysis is buttressed by a significant passage in RICO's
legislative history. Representative Mikva, discussing civil RICO's treble dam-
ages provision, specifically stated that "there need not be a conviction under
any of these laws for it to be racketeering." 116 CONG. REc. 35,342 (1970)
(statement of Rep. Mikva).
106. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49.
107. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). The Supreme Court's
discussion in Helvering of why the doctrine of res judicata is not available to
civil defendants previously found not guilty of a similar charge is particularly
noteworthy. The Court stated that an acquittal does not necessarily mean that
the defendant did not commit the acts in question; the acquittal is "merely...
an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused." Id (quoting Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291,
302 (1914)).
108. The Supreme Court in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), out-
lined the appropriate analysis for determining whether a civil proceeding en-
tails sanctions so punitive as to transform an intended civil remedy into a
criminal penalty. The first question in the analysis is whether Congress indi-
cated a preference for either a "criminal" or "civil" label Id. at 248. Here, the
private remedy in § 1964(c) is specifically labelled "civil." Second, when Con-
gress has indicated its intention to create a civil sanction, courts are to con-
sider a "helpful," but not "exhaustive," list of factors set forth in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), to determine if a civil action is so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect as to render the action criminal in nature.
These factors are: 1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, 2) whether the sanction has traditionally been regarded as punish-
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strip defendants of their constitutional armor; if constitutional
issues arise during a proceeding, specific safeguards can be ap-
plied to protect the defendant. 0 9
Second, the Sedima panel ignored several important points
in asserting that defendants should not be stigmatized with the
criminal connotations of the "racketeer" label without first
having been proven to be racketeers beyond a reasonable
doubt. 110 Obviously, stigma alone will not ordinarily render a
civil action criminal."' Even assuming that the stigma of the
"racketeer" label is constitutionally significant, however,
Sedima's prior convictions requirement will not purge civil
RICO defendants of such stigma. Even under the Sedima ap-
proach, a defendant convicted of only the predicate acts is not
ment, 3) whether the sanction is imposed only upon a finding of scienter, 4)
whether the sanction promotes the traditional aims of punishment (retribution
and deterrence), 5) whether the behavior in question is already a crime, 6)
whether there exists an alternative purpose to which the sanction may ration-
ally be connected, and 7) whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to
any alternative purpose assignable to it. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
Although the Sedima majority did not squarely address the
Ward/Mendoza-Martinez factors in its due process analysis, it did note "poten-
tial constitutional problems." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49. Since the func-
tional thrust of the panel's argument is along due process lines, this oblique
approach is puzzling. The Supreme Court has noted that it is possible for civil
sanctions to be "quasi-criminal," thus triggering some, but not all, constitu-
tional protections. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251-54 (1980). The
Sedima panel apparently decided that civil RICO actions are quasi-criminal
and thus deserving of the limited due process protection afforded by requiring
prior convictions. But see Sedima, 741 F.2d at 507 (Cardamone, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the majority did not find the statute quasi-criminal since It
did not declare the entire statute unconstitutional).
109. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (discussing proce-
dural protections of defendants in civil suits).
110. This theme is evident in many parts of the opinion. See, e.g., Sedima,
741 F.2d at 500 n.49 ("Reading private civil RICO suits not to require criminal
convictions would . . . stigmatize defendants with the appellation 'racketeer'
.... "); id at 499 ("Is one to be held liable under a lesser standard of proof In
a private right of civil action and, not incidentally, thereby stigmatized as a
'racketeer'?"); id, at 500 ("Surely being declared a 'racketeer'. . . is being held
to 'answer for' an 'infamous crime.' "); id. at 503 ("[I]f Congress had intended
defendants . . . to be stigmatized as 'racketeers,' on the basis of a preponder-
ance of the evidence, it would have said so in plainer language than it did.").
This "stigma" argument appears to be related to the panel's requirement of
mobster activity; the panel noted that such "respected and legitimate" enter-
prises as the American Express Company, E.F. Hutton & Co., Lloyd's of
London, and Merrill Lynch have been stigmatized by the "racketeer" label
that properly should be reserved for mobsters. Id. at 487.
111. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Ullman
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) and Note, Organized Crime and the Infil.
tration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124
U. PA. L. REV. 192, 214-15 (1975)).
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labelled a "racketeer" until a later civil RICO action. For ex-
ample, if a defendant is convicted of the predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud, that defendant might be labelled a "defrauder."
A civil RICO plaintiff could then sue this "defrauder" under
section 1964(c) and recover if all the elements of a civil RICO
violation are proven." 2 Until the court enters a judgment for
the plaintiff, however, the defendant is not a "racketeer," but
merely a "defrauder." Since the mere commission of predicate
offenses is not necessarily racketeering, the "racketeer stigma"
that is so offensive to the Sedima panel attaches as a result of
the civil action, based on proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, notwithstanding the prior convictions requirement." 3
Therefore, the panel's "stigma" argument, when carried to its
conclusion, fails to accomplish its intended objective.1 4
Third, the plaintiff's ability to recover "punitive" damages
under a civil RICO claim does not signal a quasi-criminal action
demanding more constitutional safeguards for the defendant.
As the Sedima dissent observed: "Congress has provided for
multiple damages, statutory punitive damages, civil penalties
and counsel fees in scores of statutes .... Treble damages
have been part of our jurisprudence for centuries ... and they
112. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c).
113. The panel also insisted on prior convictions to ensure that a defendant
is not found "guilty" of a "crime" in a civil action. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500
n49. Under Sedima, however, if a defendant is convicted of the predicate acts
and is later held liable in a civil RICO action, the defendant will have been
proved to have violated § 1962, a potential criminal offense, in a civil action.
Another problem with the "stigma" argument is apparent in light of the
panel's mobster-related racketeering injury requirement. See supra notes 27-
52 and accompanying text. Under Sedima, only alleged mobsters properly
may be civil RICO defendants. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96. If such is the case,
any person held to be a proper civil RICO defendant automatically would be
labelled a "mobster" regardless of the ultimate outcome of the action; this
would be true even if the predicate act convictions were for traditionally
"nonmobster" offenses, such as mail fraud or wire fraud. Therefore, the
"mobster stigma" would necessarily attach in the civil RICO action solely by
virtue of the court's allowing the action to proceed. Sedima's mobster-related
racketeering injury and prior predicate acts convictions requirements thus
may create more stigma than does the position they criticize.
114. This defect in the Sedima reasoning could be cured by requiring a
prior conviction under § 1962 of criminal RICO itself. In that case, the "rack-
eteer stigma" would attach at conviction since the § 1962 elements of a civil
RICO cause of action, excluding causation and damages, would be established
in the criminal proceeding. Considering, however, the fact that the federal
government often may decide to initiate civil rather than criminal RICO ac-
tions against a suspected violator if it initiates any action at all, see supra text
accompanying notes 82-85, requiring a prior criminal RICO conviction would
have the practical effect of foreclosing the use of civil RICO to a large number
of potential plaintiffs.
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have never been viewed as 'criminal' sanctions." 115 Moreover,
aside from being a permissible means of deterring RICO viola-
tions, 116 RICO's treble damages remedy may be more economi-
cally efficient than simple damages. 117
In short, the Sedima panel's prior predicate acts convic-
tions requirement is unjustifiable. The plain language of the
civil RICO provision does not require such convictions, and
there is nothing in RICO's legislative history that suggests that
Congress intended to erect such a formidable barrier to poten-
tial civil RICO plaintiffs. The Sedima panel's rewriting of the
statute, purportedly to avoid "serious constitutional questions,"
appears to be more a visceral reaction to the broad scope of civil
RICO than a logically consistent statutory analysis. The result
of this well-intentioned activism undoubtedly will be the un-
availability of civil RICO to many of the persons for whom it
was specifically designed, ironically leaving the Sedima panel's
handiwork at odds with the very legislative intent it professed
to revere.
CONCLUSION
The dramatic recent increase in civil RICO litigation has
prompted many courts to impose a variety of restrictions on the
scope of private civil RICO. The panels in Sedima and Bankers
Trust have delivered a mortal blow to civil RICO, at least in the
Second Circuit.1 18 The two panels, by requiring plaintiffs to al-
115. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505-06 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70; see also Note, Civil RICO:
The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1101, 1117 (1982) (RICO's treble damages provision advances its deterrence
function).
117. According to Professor, now Judge, Posner, economically efficient
damages remedies should be developed by considering not only the actual
harm suffered by a plaintiff, but also the probability that the penalty will be
imposed. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 171 (2d ed. 1977). In the
RICO context, the actual detection of a violation and imposition of a penalty
often is unlikely due to the violator's ability to hide behind an apparently law-
ful organizational or transactional facade. See H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE,
IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 12-18 (1970). Thus,
RICO's treble damages provision arguably is a more efficient compensator of
racketeering injuries than a simple damages provision would be.
118. There is an early indication that although Sedima and Bankers Trust
may not be followed blindly in other circuits, they at least will be influential.
In Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cr. 1984),
the Eighth Circuit seemingly overruled sub silentio the leading case of Ben-
nett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (1982), affd in part, rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983), and adopted a strain of
the Bankers Trust "discrete RICO injury" requirement. Compare Bennett, 685
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lege different types of "racketeering injuries," engrafted onto
RICO a standing requirement that has no support in its legisla-
tive history' 9 and can be "found" only from a twisted reading
of the statute. Sedima's mobster-related racketeering injury re-
quirement resulted from a mistaken notion that only members
of organized crime can commit acts that Congress has defined
as racketeering. Such a judicial amendment, rejected by Con-
gress and having serious constitutional implications, has no
place in the interpretation of a statute laid out in behavioral,
not status, terms. The Bankers Trust requirement that the in-
jury result from the pattern of racketeering activity ignores the
plain meaning of civil RICO and forecloses its use by many per-
sons suffering the most direct types of injuries. Finally,
Sedima's prior convictions requirement was the product of an
unconvincing rejection of prior case law and a tortured statu-
tory interpretation of the civil RICO provisions based on the
panel's misplaced due process notions. The panel's narrow con-
struction of civil RICO, and especially its obsession with the
stigma of the racketeer label, are not warranted in light of the
statute's remedial, as opposed to criminal, nature.
RICO unquestionably is a broad statute. Realizing this, the
F.2d at 1059 n.5 (standing granted when injury is caused by predicate acts be-
cause such acts were part of "the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering") with Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413
(standing granted because plaintiff alleged "something more than injury from
the underlying predicate acts"). The Alexander Grant court viewed its reason-
ing as consistent with Bankers Trust but inconsistent with Sedima's mobster-
related racketeering injury requirement. Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413. It
also noted Sedima's prior convictions requirement but did not pursue the issue
since it was not raised in the trial court. Id. at 413 & n.T1
The District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the issues de-
cided in Sedima and Bankers Trust in Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,826 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1984). Although
the Berg court refused to adopt any type of organized crime or racketeering
injury requirement, see idi at 90,160-62, the "sound reasoning of the Second
Circuit" persuaded the court to adopt Sedina's prior convictions requirement,
id. at 90,162.
The Seventh Circuit, however, in Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
sharply criticized both Sedima and Bankers Trust and refused to accept the
reasoning of either decision. The Haroco court felt that Sedima "revived the
discredited 'organized crime nexus' without quite saying so," Haroco, 747 F.2d
at 394, and that Bankers Trust "reduce[d] RICO's civil provisions to a trivial
remedy, available in only a tiny fraction of RICO violations and dependent
upon entirely fortuitous facts," id. at 398.
119. The legislative "history" relied on by the Sedima panel was the lack of
discussion regarding private civil RICO. See supra text accompanying notes
34-40.
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American Bar Association has issued a draft report recom-
mending legislative reform to limit its scope.120 Legislative re-
form is the most principled way to shape civil RICO into a
more consistent and effective tool to fight racketeering and pro-
vide relief to its victims.121 The judicial amendment of civil
RICO by the Sedima and Bankers Trust panels goes beyond
traditional statutory interpretation; it virtually strips civil
RICO of its usefulness, causing the statute to fail of its essential
purpose. Courts should not substantively amend statutes by
creating imagined problems and "solving" them by hypothesiz-
ing how the statute might have read "had Congress considered
the problem."' 22 Unless and until Congress amends RICO,
courts should interpret it in accordance with its plain meaning
and its manifest legislative intent.
S. Gregg Kunzi
120. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 1982); see also Wexler, supra note 10, at
334-39 (reviewing draft report).
121. See Note, supra note 116, at 1118-20; see also Furman v. Cirrito, 741
F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1984) (dictum) ("If defendants are surprised or offended
that their 'garden variety' fraudulent conduct is now statutorily characterized
as 'racketeering', they should address their grievance to congress, which
clearly and specifically included mail, wire, and securities frauds as predicate
acts of 'racketeering activity' under § 1961(1)."), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1984) (No. 84-604).
122. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502 (justifying prior convictions requirement by
presuming Congress never considered the problem of "cross[ing] into the
sphere of criminality simply by bringing a civil action"). The Supreme Court
has pointedly stated that courts should not interpret statutes by guessing what
Congress would have done had it considered an unaddressed issue: "In ascer-
taining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock
Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark." Harrison v. PPG In-
dus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980).
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